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The analysis to ensue here has a threefold
agenda: 1) a critical assessment of Arab de-
mocratisation; 2) an examination of the travails
of newly-founded ‘parliamentarisation’, the pro-
cess by which new parliaments and parlia-
mentary institutionalisation form in the context
of the 2011 uprisings. This discussion touches
on theoretical questions regarding dilemmas of
practical and normative nature; and 3) an em-
pirical note to end the analysis, generating a
reflective portrait of parliamentary capacity bu-
ilding in Arab Spring states. The article exami-
nes how ‘parliamentarisation’ is the new game
in town, as it were, in fledgling democracies.
This discussion is framed by a discussion of
the theory of human institution and the tension
between theory and practice, and between the
normative and the practical. Parliamentary ca-
pacity building is a critical issue at a time when
the deep state, old and new feuds, centrifugal
forces, and a lack of shared values seem to be
crippling the body politic in most Arab states.
For sustainable democratisation to be consoli-
dated, the set of rules, laws, procedures, and
processes must all be democratically legitimate
in order to inhibit reverses and breakdowns.
Behind this lies the key question in the age of
the Arab Spring: whether elections are provi-
ding a supporting system that enables a stron-
ger parliamentary culture to emerge. 
II. Arab democratisation and the field of
knowledge
The Arab uprisings of 2011 represent a ‘game
changer’ in terms of the ontology, epistemo-
logy and methodology that underpin the study
of good governance in the Arab Middle East
(AME). The whole paradigm of ‘democratic
transition’ in this historical moment calls for
interrogation, if not a ‘revolutionising’ of the
way it is narrated, written and spoken about
academically. This goes to the heart of what I
have elsewhere called the sphere of ‘demo-
cratic knowledge.’1 Ontologically, discussing
what ‘democratisation’ is (whatever that
should mean today) and how to exist should
caution against the excesses of praising Eu-
rocentric templates and standards, which are
under critical scrutiny in the West. Epistemo-
logically, never before has the need for nor-
mativisation of democracy required local input,
i.e. tapping into the local repertoire of indige-
nous ideas and practices. Methodologically,
whatever permeability Orientalism2 and its ide-
ational traces of the ‘civilising’ zeal with its at-
tendant processes (colonisation, nationalism,
globalisation, democratisation) and agents
(Colonists, Orientalists, etc.) still hold must be
resisted. In this context, the challenge ahead
is how to transcend the explanatory tools of
both Orientalists and Occidentalists across
disciplines that tend to transpose or superim-
pose knowing from without.
Hence, the enterprise to reframe the proble-
matic of democracy and/or democratisation in
the AME is more urgent than ever before. De-
mocracy and democratisation have for the gre-
ater part of postcolonial history been sidelined
in the ‘imagined communities’3 that nationalist
elites (military, traditional, or bourgeois) have
formed. The discussion of parliaments – ‘parli-
amentarisation’ – as an associate of democra-
tic institution building, is awash with the
de-imagining and re-imagining of communities.
These are processes spawned by the Arab
uprisings that begun in Tunisia in January
2011. Grasping their substance, even tentati-
vely, calls for careful assessment. The handi-
cap of a short-time span compromises a
longitudinal reckoning or analysis. This is one
caveat to keep in mind.
Moreover, the relationship of the AME with de-
mocracy and democratisation (and by implica-
tion the ‘West’) since the advent of European
colonialism in the mid-1800s has been fraught
with ideational tension.4 Dialogic interaction is
somewhat ‘suspended’ by epistemological ten-
sion, if not rivalry. From the outset, the Arab-
Western encounter was not going to be easy.
The ‘West’ (European colonists and much later
the US) has arrogated to itself the role of an all-
knowing agent in all matters of organising po-
litics. This is particularly true of matters related
* A shortened version of this article appeared first in Orient (III/2016).
1 Sadiki, Towards a ‘democratic knowledge’ Turn? Knowledge production in the age of the Arab Spring, 2015.
2 Said, Orientalism, 1978. 
3 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2006.
4 Gregory, The Colonial Present, 2004.
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to the art of government. For Orientalists (for-
mulators of anti-Arab or anti-Muslim con-
structs) hold the Western experience,
especially after the Enlightenment, to be no-
thing less than an exemplary democratic foun-
dation worthy of emulation by an ‘Orient’ bereft
of civic cultures and practices.5 They hold this
to be the yardstick for measuring the degree of
modernity and tradition, transition and stagna-
tion, and democracy and autocracy.
By contrast, Occidentalists (those who formu-
late anti-Western constructs) mount a defence
against this position, noting that the indigenous
mind is not a tabula rasa. The conceptual and
epistemological ground for organising the poli-
tical should be local political know-how, history,
culture, and religion. Neither line of argument is
fully compelling. Perhaps both narratives,
being equally ‘ethnocentric’ and ‘Culturalist’,
tend to distract from the normative crux of de-
mocracy as an ethos of pluralism and equality.
Going beyond both narratives and their exag-
gerated sense of ‘self-exceptionalism’ is vital in
order to reframe the parameters of a new line
of inquiry on Arab democratisation and, today,
of the study anew of Arab parliaments. To this
end, the constructs of both narratives produce
calls for a brief comparative discussion in order
to revisit the postulates of each. This is vital for
any serious undertaking to ‘problematise’ or re-
cast the question of Arab parliaments and de-
mocratisation. Thus, contextualisation of Arab
democratisation is in order.
III. Contextualising Arab democratisation
Until very recently, democracy had been consi-
dered largely irrelevant to the Arab context. ‘De-
mocracy’ and ‘Arab’ as a pair often feature as
an oxymoron. Michael C. Hudson rejects this
‘exceptionalism’, the by-product, inter alia, of
the genre of Orientalist literature that excludes
the AME from the study of democratisation, for
instance. An extension of this Orientalist bias is
the assumption of incompatibility between Islam
and democratic practices. But there are coun-
ter-arguments. The prejudicial view against
Islam has roots in an adversarial history with
Christendom. Knowledge-making and practices
in the study of Arab politics are not neutral: They
are embedded in the historically biased attitude
of Euro-American ideas towards Islam and Ara-
bism. The corollary is that many Western mis-
representations become ‘knowledge’ of the
AME, as Edward Said would put it. Generalisa-
tions about Islam and Islamists and their assu-
med hostility to democracy aside, Islamic and
Western democratic values share a number of
foundational concepts and values of equality,
justice, and good government.6 The post-1945
democratic model, filtered through American
pluralism, defies reproduction in the AME. This
is not to argue either that democracy should be
‘occidentalised’ as exclusively Western or that
an Arab democratic model will be sui generis. At
least in theory, the common denominator alre-
ady exists. Islam’s concepts of consultation
(shūrā) and consensus jostle for recognition as
equal to and compatible with democracy’s most
basic principles of participation and contesta-
tion.7 Islam’s principles of equality and justice,
claim many Muslim scholars, have analogues
in Western democracy.8
The intellectual artefacts diffused by transitolo-
gists and Euro-American students of good go-
vernance do not yield the same resonance in
the AME. Once deracinated of their temporal
and spatial contexts, they struggle to germinate
as intended by their original inventors or ‘ex-
porters’. Similarly, a fledgling ‘Arab transitology’
mimetically engaging with its Western counter-
part fails to transfer the democratic knowing and
knowledge-making decoupled from time and
space. Thus the problematic of discussing Arab
democracy and democratisation stumbles from
the outset upon fundamentally conceptual and
theoretical problems. Democracy and demo-
cratisation have tended to resist transition to the
Arab setting as much as the AME’s political and
civil societies and establishments have resisted
transiting to democracy and democratisation.
Conceptually and theoretically, Western theo-
retical frameworks and concepts do not always
explain Arab peculiarities. This is despite the
wide usage of neologisms such as
‘dīmuqrāṭiyyah’, ‘damaqraṭah’, or ‘taḥawwul
dīmuqrāṭi’ (respectively the Arabic terms for ‘de-
mocracy’, ‘democratisation’, and ‘democratic
transition’). The nature of the intellectual enga-
gement with this problematic remains wanting
in rigour, continuity, cumulative knowing, and in
an enriching empirical milieu. The Arab enga-
gement with the problematic cannot mimic its
counterpart without a local democratic know-
ledge of its own to supplement whatever com-
parative learning can be gleaned from global
examples. This local democratic knowing re-
5 Gellner, Muslim Societies, 1989.
6 Sadiki, The Search for Arab Democracy, 2004, 30-42.
7 Esposito and Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 1991, 430-436.
8 Abou El-Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, 2004, 21-25.
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mains either limited, under-developed, or un-
supported by an empirically didactic setting. On
the whole, democracy and democratisation are
weighed down by superficial electoralism, as
shall be explained below, introduced in the con-
temporary AME no more than thirty years ago
in Egypt.9 The twin ills of conceptual/theoretical
borrowing and empirical paucity furnish limited
material for enquiry into the problematic of de-
mocracy and democratisation in the AME. Fur-
thermore, Orientalist-Occidentalist sparring has
continuously shaped and marred the crux of the
discussion. This sparring records a longstan-
ding history of mutual exclusion. The vestiges
of this mutual exclusion have not facilitated a
sober dialogue – or dialogical disputation. This
has been at the expense of mutual accommo-
dation and an exchange of learning beneficial
for strengthening parliaments and building de-
mocratic institutions in the AME.
Analytical paradigms created with special refe-
rence to European and North American con-
texts will no doubt defy transposition to different
settings. The democratisation paradigm must
be fluid, flexible, and sensitive to linguistic, his-
torical, and cultural factors in the AME. Demo-
cratisation ought to be defended and instituted
in the AME. However, the danger of homoge-
nising meanings of how parliaments are
strengthened and built and how democratisa-
tion is institutionalised lies in the attempt to en-
close them in a single framework (such as
‘third wave’) to the point that they cannot speak
to a different setting. For such meanings are
trapped in a single way of understanding the
world. A paradigm that speaks with the singu-
larity of ‘truth’ requires reassessment of its
basic precepts. Attempts by Laurence White-
head and Thomas Carothers to critically reas-
sess the ‘status’ not only of ‘third wave’
democratisation, but also – with their whole pa-
radigmatic edifice of democratisation – provide
food for thought for any serious study of how
democracy and democratisation fare outside
their Western settings. 
Thus Whitehead10 correctly notes that “if ‘de-
mocracy’ is viewed as a contested and to
some extent unstable concept, anchored
through the invocation of practical knowledge
and a deliberative filter or collective delibera-
tion, then democratisation can only come
about through a lengthy process of social con-
struction that is bound to be relatively open-
ended.”
Supplementing this is Carothers’ critique:
“It is time to recognise that the transi-
tion paradigm has outlived its useful-
ness and to look for a better
lens…[T]he almost automatic assump-
tion of democracy promoters during the
peak years of the third wave that any
country moving away from dictatorship
was in ‘transition to democracy’ has
often been inaccurate and misleading.
Some of those countries have hardly
democratized at all. Many have taken
on a smattering of democratic features
but show few signs of democratizing
much further and are certainly not fol-
lowing any predictable democratization
script.”11
Only a form of ‘minimalist democratic transition’
seemed to be in the offing throughout the AME
in the revolutionary period of 2011. This demo-
cratic minimalism is for now being ‘manufactu-
red’ via electoralism and seems to be sufficient
enough for the region to be ‘slotted’ into the so-
called global ‘march of democracy’. These re-
volutions nevertheless happened in diverse
polities for different reasons and according to
various political rules and rationales. Perhaps
for the populous and impoverished states elec-
toralism was perhaps calculated to qualify them
for the ‘affection’ of the global donor community
– the EU, US, IMF, and World Bank, etc. For
countries with petro-dollar largesse, bar Mu-
ammar Gaddafi’s Libya, which increasingly
found itself under a US security umbrella, elec-
tions were minimum concessionary mecha-
nisms aimed at managing vulnerability to
American patronage and tutelage (democracy
promotion). For others, the age of material ‘pro-
vidence’ has long passed. Neither state coffers
nor the entrenchment of the ‘Washington con-
sensus’ permit subsidies. Thus the state’s dis-
tributive function has changed since the early
1990s changed: from a distributor of bread to a
distributor of democracy. But this shift in distri-
bution does not mean regulation is ‘democra-
tic’. Regulation remained largely coercive – but
with some improvement in juridical regulation in
some parts of the AME. Also, electoralism was
one medium by which EU Arab ‘clients’ could
secure the sponsorship or good will of political
benefactors – for instance, France, Germany,
and Spain for Arab regimes with Euro-Med as-
sociations (e.g. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s Tuni-
sia, and Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt).
9 Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization, 2009.
10 Whitehead, Democratization, 2002, 30.
11 Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 2004, 168; 176.
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For students of democratic transition, analysing
parliamentary institutions and procedures as
well as electoral data can be one method of
verifying the occurrence of democratisation.
The figures and numbers produced by every
election in the pre-Arab Spring AME have dazz-
led researchers. However, elections are still im-
perfect and new, including in the new Arab
Spring geography today, and may be partly
cosmetic if not sustained with additional demo-
cratising processes in the future. Like all num-
bers, they did lend themselves to manipulation.
The mathematical logic of one plus one equals
two in these elections does not ‘add up’. Two
elections equate in the ‘transitology’ of gurus of
democracy like Samuel Huntington with a cer-
tain transcendence of a democratic threshold.12
Kuwait has had four elections in the past four
years. Egypt had more than a dozen between
the late 1970s and the January 25 Revolution of
2011. Iraq has had seven since 2003. For now,
the only number that comes to mind when ad-
ding elections to democracy is cipher (the Ara-
bic word for zero).
Despite being awash in elections, and what I
call ‘election fetishism,’13 parliaments have neit-
her strengthened nor weakened executive au-
thority, have not held rulers to account, and nor
have they resulted in effective parliamentary
oversight. To be precise, the ubiquity of elec-
tions has not translated into democratic prac-
tice. Indeed, it is apt to talk about ‘election fever’
in the AME. More than a decade ago, elections
were infrequent. Today they take place with re-
gularity. However, in the ten years prior to the
political ‘tsunami’ that engulfed the Arab region,
not a year passed without at least half-a-dozen
elections. They happened in Arab monarchies
and republics, in secular and religious states, in
oil-rich and less prosperous countries, and in
political realms with and without rigid ideolo-
gies. It is against this backdrop that ‘parliamen-
tarisation’ must be understood. Likewise, the
context of the Arab Spring is no less important.
IV. Parliamentarisation: The normative vs.
the practical
Parliamentarisation is taken here to be a two-
fold process. It consists of 1) an institutional
component, namely the machinery and the at-
tendant technical know-how that operate as a
logistical support system for the facilitation of
parliamentary function (quasi ‘infrastructure’);
and 2) the set of values and legal-rational sys-
tem (quasi ‘superstructure’) that is constitutive
of the diverse capacities for legislative duties
dispensation. Generally, Arab parliaments have
– with very few qualified exceptions – neither
functioned autonomously nor upgraded their
capacity building in ways that could limit exe-
cutive excesses, hold rulers to account, repre-
sent the people, make, revise, and change laws
as befits time and space, and align with the
‘common will’. The salient feature of most Arab
legislative bodies (Majlis Al-Umma, or National
Assembly; Majlis Al-Nuwwāb, or Council of De-
puties, Majlis Al-Shūrā, or Consultative Coun-
cil; and Al-Majlis Al-Waṭanī, or the National
Assembly, among other appellations) tended to
be cosmetic and deferential, and an Arab parli-
ament hits its nadir as a rubber stamp institu-
tion. Almost invariably, the pre-2011 revolutions
period is littered with examples of such functio-
nal ill-disposition towards sound parliamentary
performance. In their chequered history as in-
stitutions labouring under the duress of autho-
ritarian regimes, Arab parliaments amounted to
a necessary ‘decorum’ to brandish as proof of
good governance by omnipotent rulers, natio-
nal-secularist and traditional, in whose hands
the means of all power fell – executive, legisla-
tive, and juridical. As a result, coercive power
was deployed without the checks of due pro-
cess and parliamentary oversight. Arab authors
documenting the functions of the three powers
in Arab systems agree on the blurring of boun-
daries between the executive and legislative
powers.14
The irony of course is that pilloried systems
such as in Lebanon (with its divided confessio-
nal polity) and Kuwait (with its discontinuous le-
gislative life due to a brand of electoral politics
noted for “progression and retrogression” re-
sulting from dissolutions of the elected legisla-
ture)15 boast some of the most interrogative and
interactive parliaments.16 The mix of political
ideologies, sects, and alliances very often put
sessions at a boiling point, erupting into caco-
phonous and wild scenes and causing rucku-
ses over all kinds of seemingly perennial
disagreements. Both countries’ parliaments suf-
fer from ephemeral paralysis. Note the Leban-
ese parliament’s dysfunction of late; a
dysfunction that verges on illegality and per-
haps unconstitutionality. It acted twice to extend
12 Huntington, The Third Wave, 1991.
13 Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization, 2009.
14 Al-Tamawi, Al-Sulutāt al-Thalātha fī al-Dasātir al-‘Arabiyya al-Mu’āṣira wa-fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1996, 20-67.
15 Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization, 2009, 108-115.
16 Al-Maqata’, Al-Istijwāb al-Barlamānī lil-Wuzarā’ fī al-Kuwayt, 2002, 5-19.
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the incumbent president’s mandate in office:
1) on 31st May 2013, deputies extended his
mandate for an additional 17 months; 2) and on
5th November 2014 it did the same, leaving the
president in office and unelected until June
2017. Similarly, agreement on when new legis-
lative elections should take place has eluded
parliament. The last elections were held on 7th
June 2009. What one takes from this is one key
observation. Thus far the paucity of writings on
Arab legislatures has not favoured a line of his-
torical investigation that captures the oddity that
parliamentary atrophy (to which polities des-
cend, as in Kuwait) often results from the exer-
cise of holding ministers accountable and
enforcing parliamentary oversight. So many
years were written off from the life of Kuwait’s
National Assembly when Emiri decrees sus-
pended the work of parliament given that exer-
cising parliamentary oversight stood at odds
with the political interests and preferences of
the ruling Al Sabah family – in the 1960s, in the
1980s, in the 1990s, and more recently. I have
elsewhere rehearsed these cycles of democra-
tic “progression and retrogression” with refe-
rence to Kuwait, among other Arab countries.17
It was this very intent to unleash parliamentary
oversight and the questioning of government
negligence or ministerial incompetence that set
off the widespread ‘you stink’ protests in the
summer of 2015 in Lebanon.18 Note how these
protests changed from a single issue campaign
to a campaign enveloping a wider political
agenda. Thus the ‘you stink’ protests in Beirut
took a leaf from the book of young rioters in
Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Tunisia by deman-
ding not just the resignation of the environment
minister for failure to recycle trash. They went
further, demanding the resignation of the entire
government on grounds of corruption and lack
of accountability.19 Note how ‘electoral reforms’
occupied a central theme in such protests. One
placard from the protests in a photo in the arti-
cle by Martin Jay reads “you recycled the parli-
ament, now recycle the trash.”20 It is a ‘gem’
worth a thousand words. It captures public dis-
affection against the illegal extension of the
mandate of parliament without elections –
hence the reference to ‘recycling’. Two points
transpire from the above. The blurring of boun-
daries when rulers act as a system above the
system, such as in Kuwait, dents the legitimacy
of the legislature and weakens the dispensa-
tion of parliamentary duties. It is a deeply-roo-
ted disequilibrium in most Arab political systems
whereby the legislative becomes accountable
to the executive.21 This reverses the ‘democra-
tic’ pyramid on its head. Applying parliamentary
oversight has not necessarily failed in Arab le-
gislatures; it is a capacity that has engendered
all kinds of struggles, but not without a huge po-
litical price: the suspension of parliament in Ku-
wait and its near dysfunction in Lebanon.
Thus it is perhaps presumptuous to issue swee-
ping generalisations that, in its commitment to
discharge of the legislative function and to over-
sight of the executive branch of government,
make it sound as if parliamentary capacity is la-
cking. Rather, the parliamentary function has
been tattered by the excesses of either execu-
tive power (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Egypt,
Yemen, and Algeria) or the overwhelming stran-
glehold over its reins, such as in Kuwait, where
a ruling house happens to be the pivot of the
entire political system. This applies almost in-
variably to most other Arab monarchies. This
observation calls for a more nuanced evalua-
tion by scholars ‘profiling’ the standards of par-
liamentary function in the Arab region. 
Indeed, the Eurocentric view that proposes
Euro-American history and practice as the stan-
dard bearer must not lose sight of the trying
conditions under which ‘decorum parliaments’
operate. Not many would quarrel with the defi-
nition of parliament as tasked with measuring
up to these standard Euro-American bench-
marks: representative, open and transparent,
accessible, accountable, effective, and enga-
ging with the global community – as versus clo-
sed.22 However, how realistic it is to universalise
these as standard reference points? This is
where the need to relativise is most imperative.
This goes to the heart of the theory of human in-
stitution. This harks back to a classic but rather
ambiguous division or tension between ‘what is’
and ‘what should be’ – i.e. the descriptive ver-
sus the normative.
Normativising parliamentary good practice, in
terms of institutional strengthening and deepe-
ning the aforementioned values, cannot defy
the rules of temporality and spatiality. It is an in-
evitable straightjacket. The normative is itself
17 Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization, 2009, 120-125.
18 Naylor and Haidamous, Trash crisis sparks clashes over corruption, and dysfunction in Lebanon, 2016.
19 Jay, Speaking to the organisers of Beirut’s stink group, 2015.
20 Ibid.
21 Hassan, Al-Tawāzun bayna al-Sulṭatayn al-Tashrī’yya wa-l-Tanfīdhiyya, 2006.
22 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century, 2006.
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socially constructed, created and incubated if
not in specific time and space then definitely in
a social world of ideas, culture, language, and
political dynamics that inform constitution, insti-
tution, and identity. That is, in political terms the
distributive looms large and this is what parlia-
ments vie for across boundaries of geography,
history, language, and culture: the regulation of
distribution of power by an association of ide-
ally representative people who make laws and
are concomitantly governed by them. In politics,
then, distribution is intrinsic to the vocation of
practitioners, parliamentarians included. Harold
Laswell’s classic conceptualisation of politics in
non-esoteric and practical ways exudes a defi-
nite sense of distribution: “who gets what,
when, and how.”23 In theory, parliament is the
ideal channel for regulating the distribution of
public benefits and deprivations in any functio-
nal polity. Distribution is about representing the
diverse differences24 in the course of distribu-
ting power through legal means.
In the same vein, David Easton adds another
challenging claim on the theory and practice
of politics of relevance to the normative acti-
vity of what parliaments are meant to do in a
democracy: “the authoritative allocation of va-
lues for a society.”25 The operative words here
are ‘allocation’ as in distribution, ‘authoritative’
as in legally-binding, and ‘values’, which refer
to any material and immaterial ‘good’ delive-
rable by government action. This theoretical
drive – which touches on the normative side
of the political with its implications for the func-
tion of distribution, in which parliamentarians
should function as legal enforcers – is a red
herring, a logical fallacy. Distribution of power
is still in its infancy in most Arab polities and
parliaments are yet to be tasked with anything
akin to distribution. Authoritative government
activity that is meant to be governed by law-
makers in parliament in the overseeing of im-
plementation of legislation on the allocation of
any kind of value tends to be the exclusive
bastion of powerful individuals, parties, or fa-
milies that cannot be kept in check by parlia-
mentary oversight. Attempts to do so, as in
Kuwait, often result in political crisis and/or the
closure of legislature.
It is fallacious, however, to argue that there is a
single and fixed scale that can be universally
used to measure sound parliamentary practice.
In the diverse society of nation-states, nations
are not equal in terms of development, socio-
economic conditions, colonial legacy, capitalist
penetration, diffusion of globalising forces, and
overall stock of social capital that inform politi-
cal identity and civic disposition,26 including af-
fective influences that nurture nepotistic
relations and patronage client networks. It is
said that people often get the government they
deserve. By the same token, people will always
get the parliament they deserve – with factors
like these without a doubt defining the shape
and form of legislatures. Lindberg27 has reason
to believe that even elections may be means to
cultivate neo-patrimonial relations. The Arab
world is no exception. Vote-buying is common-
place in elections in Egypt and Kuwait.28 The
scale used by the UNDP, which presents a
quasi-esoteric understanding that correlates
sound parliamentary work with ‘good gover-
nance,’29 is difficult to pin down across the
board, universally, with precision. Specificity
matters. Perhaps only the reasonableness of
commitment to legislation, defence, protection,
and revision of the communal common good
(however it is defined in time and space) pre-
sents one ideal that may be commensurable
with ‘sound’ parliamentary practice. 
IV.1 Human institution: practical and evaluative
issues
This takes us to Kelley’s point about the pur-
poses of an institution: figuring out the purpo-
ses of a given human institution – in our case
parliaments – and evaluating them on the
basis of implementing and committing to
those purposes.30 This, Kelley has noted,
should blur the boundaries between the des-
criptive and the normative, presenting social
science theorists with a “theoretical predica-
ment”31 on how to strike a balance within a co-
herent and “scientific theory of legislation” that
bridges the gap between theory and practice:
between the descriptive (what is – the practi-
cal side of things) and the normative (what
should be – evaluative aspects). To resolve
23 Laswell, Politics, 1958.
24 Sadiki, The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia, 2002.
25 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, 1965, 96.
26 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work, 1994.
27 Lindberg, It’s our time to ‘chop’, 2003.
28 Al-Jasser, Accusations of Vote-Buying Ahead of Kuwait Elections, 2013.
29 Johnson and Nakamura, A concept paper on legislatures and good governance, 1999.
30 Kelley, Theories of legislation and statutory interpretation, 2009. 
31 Ibid. 121-122.
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this predicament, Kelley turns to the metho-
dology of Australian legal scholar and philo-
sopher John Finnis – as outlined in his book
Natural Law and Natural rights.32 A human in-
stitution or a given legislative process is iden-
tifiable by “its practical point or basic
objective,” according to Finnis.33 The objective
refers here to the sum of “actions, practices,
discourse” constructed by those active in that
institution. Referring to Finnis, Kelley states
the following: 
“Anyone attempting to formulate an
adequate scientific theory of human in-
stitution must therefore adopt the inter-
nal point of view of once concerned to
act within that institution, and, using
that internal point of view, identify the
practical point of that institution.”34
Thus the predicament is presented, which
Finnis defuses based on a two-pronged ap-
proach: firstly, “one should identify the focal or
central case of the institution”; and secondly,
“one should adopt the internal point of view of
a practically reasonable person concerned to
act within the institution, and hence use basic
principles of practical reasoning to test pro-
posed answers to the basic theoretical ques-
tions.”35 This one reason specificity matters –
context not just ‘text’, i.e. the ‘theory’ of what
parliaments are supposed to do and how they
should perform, which must be of paramount
importance in understanding what capacity
building should mean in a given Arab country.
Theories exported from the ‘West to the rest’
are not universally applicable. The search for
‘one size fits all’-type solutions and theories
defy the realities in which parliaments ope-
rate. So in resolving the proposed predica-
ment, Kelley, again, relies on Finnis’s
reasoning that “once one has identified the
practical point or basic objective of an institu-
tion, the next step in the analysis is necessa-
rily an evaluative question: how well or to
what extent does this institution achieve its
objective? Thus, any adequate descriptive so-
cial science theory will also be normative or
evaluative to a certain extent.”36
Kelley finds value in the utility of Finnis’ me-
thodology in developing a theory of legisla-
tive process. He believes that this
methodology explains how the legislative
process may be found to be commensurable
with the ‘common good’, even if this may be
generally contested and indeterminate.37 He
refers to Finnis as understanding the com-
mon good “from the standpoint of the practi-
cally-reasonable-person.”38 Here, the
common good “may be understood as the
set of conditions that enables or allows each
member of the community to participate in
the goods he or she chooses.”39 Such
‘goods’ include desiderata ranging from the
pursuit of knowledge to other types of fulfil-
ment: leisure, freedom, security, religion, life,
etc.40 Finnis has three tests of the common
good of relevance to the legislative process
in theoretical and practical terms: 1) the
“practical reasonableness” that each of these
values are “good for any and every person”;
2) inclusive in that “it can be participated in
by an inexhaustible number of persons in an
inexhaustible variety of ways”; and 3) “a set
of conditions” that commands communal
cooperation whereby “members of the com-
munity have reason to collaborate with each
other (positively and negatively)” in society,
in the pursuit of such good.41
In light of Finnis’s methodology, as elaborated
by Kelley, part of the inquiry into Arab parlia-
ments must be geared towards exploring the
internal objectives of legislatives processes.
This should address both practical and theore-
tical issues. Practically, parliamentary know-
how must tilt towards obeying local demands
within the constraints of time, space, and poli-
tical exigencies and circumstances. Theoreti-
cally, instead of overdoing the application of
external scales in measuring parliamentary
practice, it is far more useful to devise evalua-
tive methods commensurate with local legisla-
tive objectives. The rise of parliamentarisation
is an opportunity to think anew and de rigeur
to enable more autonomous reification of local
know-how and scales. Strategies to reify theo-
ries of legislation and parliamentary practice
32 Ibid. 122.







40 Finnis quoted in Ibid. 125.
41 Finnis in Ibid. 125.
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cannot be undertaken in monolithic ways that
ignore specificity.
The challenge is to shift emphasis towards
grounded theory that derives its learning out-
comes from context-specific examples. Local
know-how will be inefficient and not equipped
to cumulatively upgrade and improve if it does
not in the first instance herald a serious and
systematic practically-oriented drive with two
intertwined aims: firstly, to work towards internal
practical objectives as required by the exigen-
cies of time and space. For example, parlia-
ment building in Arab Spring states undergoing
revolutionary tumult, and torn between revolu-
tionary and counter-revolutionary currents, will
require sensitivity in the devising of practical
plans that are appropriately tied to meeting
local challenges: a constitutive assembly vs. a
national assembly or parliament. Under the cir-
cumstances of revolution, the ‘common good’
itself tends to be minimalist and geared towards
conflict resolution, bargain politics, and practi-
cality. This partly explains the success of the
methodical transition in Tunisia, whose Consti-
tuent Assembly, elected in 2011, was tasked
with drafting a newconstitution.42
The second objective is one of empowerment
through participation in the generation of eva-
luative scales that change power relations of
domination and dependence. Parliaments are
by nature constructed to reify self-governance,
and as ‘power houses’ they are in a position to
do more than the practical side of making laws
or oversight.43 This is where social scientists
come in handy, bringing to bear their metho-
dologies in order to give concrete and evi-
dence-based know-how of diverse
parliamentary practices, such as in the Arab
Spring milieu. Such undertakings facilitate
comparisons within and between them as well
as opening them to wider exposure. Alternative
practices may necessitate cross-cultural fertili-
sation, dialogue, and exchange. For ‘revolution’
is not specific to the Middle East and North
Africa, nor is ‘democratisation’, ‘parliament
strengthening’, the ‘common good’, ‘oversight’,
or ‘equality before the law’. The rationale to va-
lorise the local is not in any way intended to
close off openness to other possibilities. No
one gains by creating rigid compartments of
obliquely opposed ‘local’ and ‘external’ know-
ledge practices. But the departure point is al-
ways a kind of ‘reality check’ guided by
context-specific parliamentary situations. It is a
strategy to restore relevance to diversity and
nuance – and to issue a word of caution
against adopting monolithic methodologies. 
V. Parliamentary evolution and dissolution:
The Arab Spring context
Elections are an important democratic institu-
tion, but democracy is not merely reducible to
periodic electoral exercises. Elections are a po-
sitive step in the right direction as can be gle-
aned from the Arab Spring setting (see Table
1). Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia have collectively
held seven parliamentary elections, including
two for Constituent Assemblies (Libya 2014;
Tunisia 2011) tasked with drafting democratic
constitutions. In a three-year time span, Egypt,
under the Muslim Brotherhood-led government
and the regime that ousted it in July 2013, held
two parliamentary elections (2012; 2015). Mo-
rocco comes closest to an example of an Arab
state that has experienced at first hand the de-
monstration effect of youth-led Arab Spring pro-
test movements (e.g. 20th February
Movement). Moreover, in terms of electoral bre-
akthrough (the parliamentary elections of 2011),
the political landscape has become more plural,
with the Islamists gaining a foothold (with the
King’s blessing) for the first time in the country’s
history. Never before had the region experien-
ced such vigorously frequent polling. It is a po-
litical watershed. In theory, such regular
frequency in elections should benefit parliament
building and strengthening. 
Elections do not only invigorate politics with
new blood through the recruitment of new re-
presentatives into parliament. They also, and
more importantly, ‘habituate’ voters into the art
of participatory politics, peaceful contest of
power, the ethic of dialogue and consensus bu-
ilding, and the affirmation of civil and political
rights to representation and accountability
through elected deputies. Hence, one inevita-
ble question is whether the flurry of Arab Spring
elections such as in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and
Morocco deepen democracy through the dee-
pening of a parliamentary culture. In the case
of Morocco, there is prima facie evidence to
suggest the production of a kind of ‘demonstra-
tion effect’ (see Table 1). Elections and resul-
ting parliaments must not be turned into
‘demonstration events’ – PR exercises aimed
at external consumption. The EU or the US, as
major stakeholders in Arab democratisation,
must not throw money at parliament-strengthe-
42 Völkel, The Surprising Success of the Tunisian Parliament, 2014.
43 Salih, African Parliaments, 2006.
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ning programmes without accounting for the
local terms of reference, the type of ‘common
good’ and shared agendas, whatever they may
be – such as breaking the political monopolies
of dominant ruling parties and ruling houses as
well as enabling forms of transitional justice. In
particular, weakening the current status quo
whereby parliament and parliamentarians
seem ‘under siege’ by narrow short-term goals:
1) Khadamāt: (doing favours to individuals or
groups through service provision: documents
such as passports, exemption from national
service, or securing business deals or employ-
ment). Most Arab parliaments experience vary-
ing degrees of this mediatory role linking
parliamentarians and citizens. There is an ‘af-
fective’ aspect of this function that reduces the
work of the average Arab parliamentary repre-
sentative to that of an ‘instititionalised go-bet-
ween figure’ and in some instance a ‘political
entrepreneur’ – or wāsit. This approximates a
‘surrogate’ lobbying in settings where Arab po-
litical cultures are bereft of ‘lobbying’ on behalf
of narrow interests.
2) Tafwīdh: (a kind of ‘delegatory deference’
whereby parliaments rubber-stamp ruling cli-
ques’ political preferences). This has downsi-
zed Arab legislatures to ‘decorum parliaments’,
meaning that instead of rulers delegating
power to parliaments, the reverse is what ac-
tually happens.
Elections do not translate into robust parlia-
ment-strengthening exercises. In 2009 four
elections took place: parliamentary elections in
Lebanon and Kuwait as well as provincial elec-
tions in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqis voted
again in early 2010 to choose parliamentary re-
presentatives. However, six months later the
Iraqis failed to form a government, or more to
the point parliament did not facilitate harmony.
Nouri Al-Maliki, the then-incumbent and defea-
ted prime minister, and Iyad Allawi, a former
prime minister whose coalition won two seats
more than Al-Maliki’s Shiite bloc, disagreed for
eight months on who actually won the elections
and who had a ‘mandate’ to rule. Elections did
not generate democratic attitudes or the ne-
cessary ethical capacity to share power and
accept defeat at the polls.
Yemen’s parliamentary elections scheduled
for 2010 were delayed until 2011, while Egyp-
t’s two-round elections of November 2010
produced the most rigged and, consequently,
least representative parliament. The country’s
formidable Muslim Brotherhood, which won
20 percent of the seats in 2005, did not win a
single seat in the first round due to violence
and fraudulence, forcing it to withdraw from
the second round. Elsewhere on the Mediter-
ranean coast, Algeria’s April 2009 presidential
elections gave Abdelaziz Bouteflika a third
term after the National Assembly removed a
constitutional provision in November 2008
that limited tenure to two terms. In October
2009 Tunisians went to the polls to elect a
new parliament, and returned Ben Ali to the
presidency, institutionalising lifetime tenure in
office in pre-Arab Spring Tunisia. 
This is why the question ought, again, to be
asked about the utility of elections. The AME
is not a monolith. The diversity of time and
space points to a diverse tapestry of electoral
experiences that produce different parliamen-
tary experiences. With a vast political lands-
cape from Egypt to Yemen, the risk of
generalising about elections and parliaments
in the context of the Arab Spring is real. There
are no ‘neat constructs’ of how to analyse
elections and resulting parliament-building eff-
orts in these states, and given the short-term
span it is difficult to arrive at any meaningful,
generalisable value within the Arab Spring
context. After five years of revolutions and
counter-revolutions the state of play has yiel-
ded no more indeterminacy. Democratic tran-
sitions therefore remain historically situated,
flexible, contingent, fragmented, nuanced,
non-linear, and variable. At this current histo-
rical juncture, ‘democratic transition’ within the
Arab Spring geography (as measured by the
four states in Table 1) displays election-active
polities but not necessarily irreversible transi-
tions, or for that matter stable parliaments that
aid in the process of democratic transforma-
tion.44 Parliaments are, like the polities that
host them, torn between strong currents of re-
volution and counter-revolution. What is con-
spicuous are the contradictory pull and push
factors: pushing them away from the old
monopolies of power and singular organisa-
tion of politics, and towards democratic legiti-
macy and elected parliaments. Nonetheless,
breakdowns in Egypt and Libya (Table 1)
have made parliamentary dissolution out-
weigh evolution, unlike in Tunisia and, to an
extent, Morocco.
By stating that dissolution outweighs parlia-
mentary evolution, the idea is not underesti-
44 Barkan, Emerging legislatures, 2004.
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mate the political gains of the Arab Spring.
The point is to stress that the quality of trans-
formation has not matched the various pu-
blics’ expectations. Egypt and Libya illustrate
the point very well.45 Both revolutions ousted
two strongmen and regimes noted for ent-
renched ‘deep state’ apparatuses. They cras-
hed badly, generating spectacular revolutions,
especially in Egypt. Expectations matched
the revolutionary spectacle, which ousted po-
werful regimes: radical change and total rup-
ture with the past, which is what a revolution
is, in theory. Quwaydar talks about ‘irādat al-
taghayyur’ (the quest for change) in Libya. He
captures the country’s revolutionary senti-
ment by explaining the agency invested in
the revolutionary moment. Five years later,
the elections held in both countries were a
mismatch with the sentiment of deep trans-
formation.
V.1 Egypt
In Egypt, two parliamentary elections (not to
mention three referenda on the constitution and
two presidential elections) were held. It is not
an exaggeration to state that there is today
electoral fatigue in Egypt. The last parliamen-
tary election of 2015 is a case in point; the voter
turnout confirms both disillusionment and fati-
gue.46 The electoral committee thereafter intro-
duced a fine, the equivalent of 57 US dollars,
to punish non-voters. Thirty-five years of parli-
ament building in Egypt has not prevented dis-
solution – much less military meddling and
coups, as in July 2013. This is why there is an
ontological aspect to how parliaments come to
exist (and to what end they do so if and when
they fail to rise to the occasion when it matters
most), inhibiting the usurpation of power by nar-
row interests acting against elected institutions.
Country Parliamentary Election Consolidation Breakdown Major trend
Egypt Dec-Jan 2012 Held
July 2013 coup
Dissolution of elected 
parliament
Rise of Islamists
Oct-Nov 2015 Held Secularists’ comeback Voter indifference
Libya 7
th July 2012
General National Congress Held Dissolved 4
th Aug 2014
20th February 2014
Constituent Assembly Held Violence and discord
Win of Nationalists 
and Liberals
25th June 2014
Council of Deputies Held after delay
2013 election delayed
13th July 2014 Libya Dawn Coup




Civil war and UN 
mediation








Yemen 27th April 2011 Delayed Onset of violence Fragmentation
February 2014 Delayed Violence Civil war and nationaldialogue
COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED BY ARAB SPRING: DEMONSTRATION EFFECT
Morocco 25th Nov 2011 Held Reactionary: response to ArabSpring protests
Rise of Islamists
Alliance of King and 
Islamists
7th Oct 2016 Held Islamists confirmed in power Rise of Islamists
Table: 1 - Arab Spring elections: Parliamentary evolution and dissolution.
Arab ‘Parliamentarisation’ in the Arab Spring context
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46 Völkel, Why almost nobody participated in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, 2015.
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Egypt has had bicameral parliamentary system
(the People's Assembly, i.e. the lower house;
and the Shūrā Council, i.e. the upper house)
since the time of Anwar Sadat, who was instru-
mental in its restoration in the late 1970s. The
new constitution of 2014 created a unicameral
parliament: the People's Assembly became the
House of Representatives, to be composed of
596 MPs, and the Shūrā Council ceased to
exist.47
Elections have not prevented political sclerosis
from ruling in Egypt in the absence of strong
parliaments that provide credibility and justifi-
cation for frequent legislative polls.48 At the core
of the paralysis is the paradoxical blend of the
politics of Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Fattah Al-
Sisi, which defines the new system. In Egypt
today, the resulting tensions and contradictions
are a salient feature of a system defined by
atrophy and incompleteness. Egypt’s January
25 Revolution, which ousted Mubarak more
than five years ago, vies for attention with the
language, agents, and claimants of another
uprising, the June 30 Rebellion (Tamarrud – or
revolution). 
On paper, Mubarak and his former National De-
mocratic Party (NDP), dissolved in April 2011,
have vacated their positions of power and privi-
lege. In practice, dozens of former NDP depu-
ties have made a comeback to the parliament –
as voted in 2015 – and its committees through
a quasi-‘surrogate’ NDP mechanism, the cur-
rent regime’s ‘For the Love of Egypt’ list. Nearly
three years since the 13th July 2013 removal
from office of its democratically elected presi-
dent, Mohamed Morsi, and the Muslim Brother-
hood, Egypt is in the throes of multi-layered
crises, some of which helped spark the Janu-
ary 25 Revolution – sluggish economic growth,
corruption, injustice, marginalisation, authorita-
rianism, exclusionary politics, and excessive
executive power. 
Above all else the new makeup of the House of
Representatives does not at this historical junc-
ture bode well for institutionalising a strong par-
liamentary culture. Note that Egypt has had a
150-year history of elected councils. The disso-
lution of one parliament and the cancellation of
the results of an elected legislature dents the
credibility of the entire political system. This is
in spite of the fact that the new constitution
adopted in 2014 grants the House of Repre-
sentatives, at least in theory according to Arti-
cles 101 to 138, powers to endorse ministers
appointed by the president, discuss the state
budget, and revise laws and policies. In theory,
the new powers should weaken presidential ex-
cesses, turning Egypt (like Tunisia) into a presi-
dential-parliamentary system. 
V.2 Libya
Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) was
elected in July 2012 to form a Constituent As-
sembly (CA) tasked with drafting the constitu-
tion, and failed in its mission. Later, as Libyan
politicians disagreed and dithered, the gover-
ning National Transitional Council (NTC) opted
for direct election of members of the CA. This
indeed took place on 20th February 2014 des-
pite a raging civil war. The elections held in
2012 and the two in 2014, including the June
2014 election of the 200 members of the Coun-
cil of Deputies, divided rather than united Liby-
ans, and the voter turnout of 18 percent
confirmed this. This meant that the resulting in-
stitutions amidst a state of civil war were not ef-
fective at all and failed to perform the tasks
assigned to them, especially in terms of institu-
tion building and the completion of constitution
drafting. Instead of a stable parliamentary struc-
ture, Libyans are ruled by a bifurcated system.
The losers of the 2014 elections were the clai-
mants of power rallying around the dissolved
and now self-proclaimed GNC (made up mostly
of Islamist forces led by Noury Abu Sahmayn
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its ally, Con-
struction Party members), which was voted to
steer transition in 2012. On the other side, there
is the Council of Deputies elected in 2014 – the
polls in which Islamists lost. Both sides have mi-
litary backing (such as that of retired General
Haftar and Central Shield in Tripoli respecti-
vely), both local and international, which render
the elected institutions, new or dissolved, rat-
her farcical.
Electoral figures both capture the success and
the failure of Libya’s democratic debut. Out of a
general voting population of nearly three mil-
lion, 1.1 million voters missed registration. This
DOI-Kurzanalysen
47 At 596, the number of representatives is the highest in the country’s parliamentary history. Only 120 are
elected on party lists. The bulk, which is the 448 deputies, will be elected as independents. This to an extent
will weaken the influence of political parties in the new House of Representatives. The president can appo-
int 28 MPs, and according to Article 102 of the constitution has full discretion to appoint whoever he sees fit
amongst public figures to be parliamentarians. One condition is that up to half of the number of MPs chosen
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is understandable in a country that was in the
throes of a violent war with its ousted regime as
well as within itself – a regional and tribal sett-
ling of all kinds of disputes. The time given to
prepare for the elections was sufficient neither
for the purpose of wider inclusiveness nor for
the nascent civil and political societies to get or-
ganised and publicise their programmes pro-
perly, or organise and mobilise for the electoral
test properly. The exception is the coalition
Mahmoud Jibril was able to put together well
before the electoral campaign began, and this
to an extent explicates the success of Tahāluf
al-Quwāt al-Waṭaniyya (National Alliance For-
ces), which received the highest share of seats
of the 80 allocated to political parties.
Fluidity characterises the polity and the pro-
cess mediated by interim laws, institutions and,
still to come, the constituent body to be tasked
with constitution framing (expected to have
sixty members, twenty for each of Libya’s three
main regions: Barqa or Benghazi (Cyrenaica)
in the East, Tripolitania in the west, and Fez-
zan in the south. Not only does the substantial
number of registered voters add to this fluidity,
but so does the above average voter partici-
pation of 62 percent. This is partly due to the
election boycott in Benghazi, estimated at 70
percent in the country’s east. Moreover, since
the liberation of Tripoli at the hands of the
Shabāb or thuwwār (the army of youth staffing
the various rebel militias), the country’s Toua-
reg have been subjected to indiscriminate vio-
lence, not to mention exclusion from all
aspects of reorganising political association
and participation in Libya. The absence thus
far of a coherent and credible transitional jus-
tice process to work in tandem with electoral
contestation, participation, and institution buil-
ding has partly marred the relative success of
the Libyan elections of July 2012. In particular,
the process of political renewal – with its two-
fold dimension of participation and contestation
– has proceeded without heeding the plight of
thousands of Touareg families subjected to vio-
lence in Dereg, Ghadames, and Misrata, for-
cing huge numbers to flee to Algeria for fear of
reprisals and acts of violence.
The only success to be claimed by the Libyan
elections (see Table 2) was the return to par-
ticipation and contestation at a historic mo-
ment of ‘civic explosion’, reflected in the high
number of political parties that took part in the
elections. However, the long-term future of
these newly-found political formations re-
mains uncertain. This has been a common fe-
ature of the elections in the Arab Spring
geography: the proliferation of political parties
whose share of the total vote is minimal, frag-
menting polity. In the case of Libya, the seats
contested on the basis of individual represen-
tation produced a huge number of indepen-
dents who owe their seats to tribal and
regional patterns of voting, and are rarely tied
to the existing partisan clusters such as the
National Forces Alliance or the Muslim Brot-
herhood’s Justice and Construction Party
(Ḥizb al-‘Adāla wa Al-Binā’). Sixteen parties
have obtained one seat each; three received
two seats each; and third in rank behind Jibri-
l’s Alliance (37 seats) and the Justice and
Construction (17 seats) comes the National
Front with three seats, with the plum job of
National Congress Speaker going to its pre-
sident, Mohammed Al-Migariaf. 
Major Parties Votes Percentage of Vote Number of Seats
National Forces Alliance 714,769 48.14% 39
Justice and Construction 152,521 10.27% 17
National Front 60,592 4.08% 3
Union for the Homeland 66,772 4.50% 2
National Centrist Party 59,417 4.00% 2
Wadi Al-Hayah Party 60,566 4.07% 2
Table: 2 - Share of Vote & Seats by Major New Parties or Coalitions in the July 2012 National Congress Elections.
Arab ‘Parliamentarisation’ in the Arab Spring context
Deutsches Orient-Institut14
The ten-percent quota for women was aban-
doned in the original electoral plan, and ac-
cording to results published by the country’s
electoral observatory and watchdog, the Na-
tional High Commission for Elections, the
newly elected Congress has 33 women. The
16.5-percent seat allocation in favour of
women is a plus for the democratic process
and promising for a country noted for wide ob-
servation of religious orthodoxy. This proves
the point that religious observation does not
necessarily translate into victory for Islamist
parties or for low representation of women in
parliament.
V.3 Yemen
Yemen never held the elections scheduled
for 27th April 2011, which were intended to
‘consummate’ its legal-rational ‘entry’ into the
Arab Spring. Nor were they held in parallel
with the presidential elections of February
2014. Yemen is one election-less Arab
Spring state. Similarly, however, the National
Dialogue Conference (NDC) mechanism has
acted as a surrogate parliament in the ab-
sence of an elected National Assembly.
Yemen is equally constitution-less. A new
constitution was actually drafted and submit-
ted in early 2015 by the constitution-drafting
committee for approval by feuding politicians
(Saudi- or Iran-backed and funded), voting
by referendum and approval, but this has not
this far taken place. In the absence of a re-
presentative body, the entire decision-ma-
king process is lacking in coherence and
consensus building, with foreign meddling
and the war in Yemen aggravating the situa-
tion. For example, all representatives on the
so-called National Authority refuse to agree
on, much less implement, the outcomes
adopted by the NDC.49 Elections and the ap-
proval of the NDC outcomes are delayed in-
definitely. The Yemeni miasma is a good
example of failed institution building due to
local lack of consensus-building capacity as
transnational ‘sponsors’ wrongly pit Sunni
against Shiite, thus making decision-makers
operate outside the reach of legal-rational in-
stitutions of democratic representation as
well as traditional institutions of consultation
and reconciliation grounded in territorially de-
fined politics.
V.4 Tunisia and Morocco
Tunisia and Morocco (Table 1) seem to be the
exception to the rule in the context of the Arab
Spring. Both have instituted durable and re-
producible electoral processes that have ge-
nerated thus far stable parliamentary
processes. In both, elections and resulting par-
liaments have led to enhancing the sharing of
ideas. Parliaments have evolved into shared
forums for synergising experiences and good
practices via parliamentary channels, commit-
tees, debates, and themes and areas of legis-
lation. In the case of Tunisia, the democratic
constitution of 2014 bridged a huge gap bet-
ween leftists, secularists, and Islamists – me-
diated by the ‘Troika’ government. In the same
vein, the Moroccan system showed resilience
through a kind of skilful ‘shock absorption’ of
Arab Spring reverberations. Like in Egypt and
Tunisia, in their first parliamentary elections, Is-
lamists gained visibility and electoral endorse-
ment through legal means (see Table 1). From
this perspective, parliaments shifted from rub-
ber-stamping institutions to training grounds for
capacity development of parliamentary know-
how, including compromise, plurality, equality,
and reciprocity. These newly found experien-
ces create an opening for making good use of
ethical and practical potentialities that diverse
voices and convictions bring into parliament for
the purpose of overall capacity building in fled-
gling democracies. 
The second legislative election, of October
2014, was significant, but not for the results it
produced. Rather, it indicated that Tunisia’s
transition had entered a phase of consolida-
tion: deepening parliamentary culture, and bu-
ilding on existing democratic gains and reforms
introduced since 2011. The most obvious re-
sult in the October 2014 election was the com-
plete change in the landscape of the political
parties in parliament and at the level of the
state. With 69 seats, the Islamist Nahda Party
came second to Nidaa Tounes. Nahda’s troika
partners, the CPR and Ettakatol, respectively
with 3 and 1 seats, had a devastatingly poor
showing. The two parties disintegrated due to
internal disarray and infighting well before the
2014 election. More importantly, the troika par-
ties suffered a collective defeat: their combined
number of seats stands at 73, 12 seats fewer
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than Nidaa Tounes, which won 85 seats. The
volatility of power in the 2011-2013 period did
not help the troika parties. 
Voters punished Nahda and its junior partners
for failing to deliver on social justice, for read-
mitting former regime figures into politics, for
the deteriorating security and economy, for its
overall poor leadership and political inexpe-
rience, and for the rise of religious extremism
and violence. The World Bank is of the view
that the pre-revolution economic failings in job
creation, improving exports, and reducing re-
gional persist. Partly, the strong showing of the
troika parties in the 2011 National Constituent
Assembly election is attributable to a sympa-
thy vote element, especially in the context of
the aftermath of the revolution. What makes
the consolidation theme an important one for
future studies of Tunisia’s democratic transition
is the unique opportunity to strengthen parlia-
ment, which now has fully elected rather than
appointed members. The Islamist Nahda lost
in the legislative elections to Nidaa Tounes in
October 2014. These outcomes are unique to
the Arab region and for the first time there is
the twin process of transition-consolidation
being played out in Tunisia through free, fair,
and democratic elections. 
VI. Conclusion
Parliamentarisation is today torn between evo-
lution and dissolution trends as well as bet-
ween revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
currents. Elections seem to have gained in fre-
quency, especially in the Arab Spring geogra-
phy. In the case of both Tunisia and Morocco,
the entry into parliament of Islamists and lef-
tists formerly excluded from power has not only
solidified formal channels of governance and
power-sharing, but has also multiplied informal
structures and forums for reconciling former
political foes. In the context of the Arab Spring,
reformist undertakings have differed in terms
of pace, content, depth, and breadth. Only in
Tunisia can one say that there is a clear direc-
tion towards democratic consolidation after two
legislative elections (2011 and 2014), and to a
lesser extent the two rounds of the presiden-
tial elections that in December 2014 gave Tu-
nisia its first democratically elected president
since its independence from France in 1956,
who is today working with a democratically
elected parliament under the aegis of a demo-
cratic constitution. The scale by which this
brand of parliamentarisation ought to be ap-
praised must be realistic and favour local aspi-
rations, whatever they may be. 
Understanding processes of parliamentary
consolidation and democratisation in the Arab
Spring geography requires the benefit of a lon-
ger time span as well as middle-ground theo-
ries that reconcile the normative and the
practical. Political scientists must devise me-
thods and theories of parliamentary capacity
building that are sensitive to these new expe-
riences and perhaps the study of local dis-
courses and practices would be one step in the
right direction. Comparative studies and ana-
lysis of success and failure in parliamentary ca-
pacity building based on Arab Spring legislative
processes are imperative. As in all social scien-
ces enquiry, our claim to ‘truth’, however defi-
ned, will depend not only on middle-ground
theories, but also on the interpretation of con-
text- and case-specific empirical tests.
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